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tuality and temporal context) were explicit in this patient. From
the hierarchical nature of the theory, if high-level elements are ex-
plicit, low-level elements must be explicit too, and the patient
should be unimpaired on indirect tests. Hence, the impaired per-
formance of this patient on indirect tests presents a real puzzle for
the theory.
Equally troubling are the predictions that the theory would
make with regard to the ability of successful performance on a di-
rect test to predict performance on an indirect test. If the two tests
were administered successively, then successful memory of an
item on the direct test would suggest that the high-level elements
of the representation for that item were made explicit. Because in-
direct tests can benefit from elements that have either been made
explicit or not, the probability that the item will be produced on
the indirect test, conditional on its having been remembered on
the direct test, is higher than had it not been remembered on the
direct test. This prediction has been disconfirmed. Tulving et al.
(1982; Hayman & Tulving 1989) found stochastic independence
between word recognition (direct test) and a subsequent word-
fragment completion test (indirect test).
Finally, according to D&P, what determines bona fide perfor-
mance on an indirect test is implicit representation of the elements
of a fact (or elements of the attitude or self) that constitute part of
the proposition. Presumably, the propositional nature of the rep-
resentation should be insensitive to format of presentation. Yet for-
mat of presentation seems to be a critical factor in predicting im-
plicit memory performance. For example, on tests such as
perceptual identification (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas 1981) or word-frag-
ment completion (e.g., Tulving et al. 1982), where subjects are re-
quired to identify a visually degraded display, indirect memory per-
formance is diminished, or completely eliminated, if the similarity
of retrieval cues (e.g., word fragments) to studied items is reduced
by crossing the modality of presentation between study and test
(e.g., Jacoby & Dallas 1981; for a comprehensive review, see Roedi-
ger & McDermott 1993). Moreover, even when study and test pre-
sentations are within the same modality, presenting different study
and test materials such as words and pictures (e.g., Weldon 1991)
or words in different languages (e.g., Kirsner & Dunn 1989) has
been shown to reduce performance on indirect tests. It is unclear
how a propositional theory can account for these findings.
Implicit and explicit knowledge: One
representational medium or many?
James A. Hampton
Department of Psychology, City University, London EC1V 0HB, England.
j.a.hampton@city.ac.uk www.city.ac.uk
Abstract: In Dienes & Perner’s analysis, implicitly represented knowl-
edge differs from explicitly represented knowledge only in the attribution
of properties to specific events and to self-awareness of the knower. This
commentary questions whether implicit knowledge should be thought of
as being represented in the same conceptual vocabulary; rather, it may in-
volve a quite different form of representation.
Implicit knowledge is characteristic of most human cognition
(and, as far as one can tell, of all animal cognition). If a proper ac-
count could be given of levels of implicit representation, it would
therefore have tremendous explanatory power and would open up
a way to understanding numerous problems in cognitive science.
A proper distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge is
important in the study of conceptual knowledge. When interro-
gated about the contents of their conceptual knowledge, it is well
known that people generate variable and idiosyncratic responses
(Rosch & Mervis 1975). For example, in one unpublished study, I
examined the relation between the relative importance that peo-
ple attach to criterial properties of a concept and their judgements
of the relative typicality of instances of the same concept. Subjects
performed two tasks. The first was to rank order a set of proper-
ties in terms of how relevant they were to the definition of a cate-
gory. The second was to rank order a set of category instances in
terms of their typicality. The data were analyzed to measure the
similarity between individuals on either task. If people have ex-
plicit knowledge of the reasons why they consider some instances
more typical than others, and if there is any individual variability
amongst the population (as could reasonably be expected), then
the similarity of a pair of individuals on one task should be related
to their similarity on the other task.
When the two sets of similarities were compared, however, the
pattern of similarity between individuals in terms of the centrality
of attributes showed no correspondence at all with the pattern of
similarity between individuals in terms of instance typicality. It ap-
pears then that much of our conceptual knowledge is implicit.
If conceptual understanding is implicit, then the critical ques-
tion will be how the representational language of explicit knowl-
edge is grounded in implicit knowledge. The challenge is to pro-
vide a semantics for knowledge representation with the flexibility
of the different levels of explicit/implicit awareness. Is the con-
ceptual representational language the same at different levels of
the system, and is it only the predication of properties to objects
or events and to the self as knower that differentiates the levels?
This would appear to be D&P’s view. Or should the representa-
tion of knowledge using a vocabulary based on natural language
be restricted to explicit levels of representation?
Fodor (1998) has argued strongly against the grounding of ex-
plicit concept terms (such as bird or bachelor) in a more implicit
set of semantic features or roles. To Fodor, the meaning of the
word “bird” is just BIRD – a conceptual atom that is grounded
through its symbolic relation to the class of birds in the real world.
We may learn that certain propositions hold of birds in general
(e.g., that birds are creatures), but this set of propositions –
whether necessarily true or not – is not constitutive of the mean-
ing of the concept.
In section 2.2., D&P suggest that an atomic, nondecomposable
representation may be thought of as having an implicitly repre-
sented property structure. For example, whereas “bachelor” can
be decomposed into its component features, on any particular oc-
casion it may be used in an explicit representation without being
decomposed. A person may be able to claim, “I knew that I was
looking for a bachelor, but I had neglected the fact that the per-
son would have to be unmarried.” Yet there is clearly a major dif-
ference between this type of atomism and the type advocated by
Fodor. Fodor’s arguments for conceptual atomism suggest that
there is no implicit property structure encoded at some deeper or
more hidden level – there is just an informational semantic con-
nection to the class of bachelors, and the possibility of learned
generalisations that one could make about the class.
The problem becomes more apparent if one asks that informa-
tion one would wish to include in the implicit conceptual struc-
ture of a representation, and how this information might be con-
strained or determined. D&P suggest that implicit conceptual
structure involves “necessary supporting facts.” The closest they
come to giving a detailed account of these is when they state, “Us-
ing ‘bachelor,’ oneself commits one quite strongly to ‘male’ and
‘unmarried’ lest one show oneself ignorant of the meaning of the
word bachelor in the language spoken” (sect. 1).
But in using the term, one is also committed to an indefinite
number of other propositions such as “not a vegetable” or “com-
posed of cells containing DNA,” while in addition one is commit-
ted (to a greater or lesser extent) to all the more prototypical as-
pects of being a bachelor, such as living alone, wariness of
marriage, or fondness for solitude. There is no simple logical way
of selecting those aspects of a concept’s meaning that should be
considered as forming the implicit conceptual structure, from, on
the one hand, the indefinitely large number of necessary infer-
ences that follow from the concept, and, on the other hand, the
many probabilistically related attributes that characterise so much
of our conceptual knowledge.
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A clear account of the implicit/explicit distinction with respect
to conceptual content is needed in cognitive science. In making
connections across disparate fields of cognition, Dienes & Perner
have drawn attention to the possibility of offering a unifying ac-
count of the distinction, which would have far-reaching conse-
quences. It remains to be seen, however, whether it makes sense
to think of the implicit representation of knowledge making use of
the same language-like representational medium as is found in 
explicit conceptualisation.
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Abstract: Three forms of implicit knowledge are presented (functional,
structural, and procedural). These forms differ in the way they are made
explicit and hence in how they are represented by the individual. We sug-
gest that the framework presented by Dienes & Perner does not account
for these differences.
Dienes & Perner (D&P) present a framework for conceptualizing
the nature of mental representations that attempts to capture the
various natural language uses of implicit and explicit knowledge.
Although D&P find several points of agreement between the dif-
ferent uses of implicit, we suggest that they do not adequately cap-
ture the nature of “fully implicit” knowledge; hence essential,
qualitative differences inherent in the different uses of implicit are
lost in the D&P framework. There are at least three forms of im-
plicit knowledge: structural, functional, and procedural. The dif-
ferences between them become apparent when one considers
what is needed to make them explicit.
One form of implicit knowledge derives from “property-struc-
ture” implicitness (sect. 2.2) in which an explicitly represented
property (e.g., “bachelor”) is a compound of two or more basic
properties (e.g., “unmarried” and “male”). Property-structure im-
plicit knowledge is semantically related to explicit knowledge:
One cannot use the word “bachelor” correctly without knowing
that it means “unmarried” and “male.” For knowledge that is
structurally implicit to become implicit, an individual need only
consciously reflect on the implications of the explicit knowledge.
The explicit property (e.g., “bachelor”) acts as a heuristic for re-
calling the implicit properties and so on individual can easily pro-
vide the longer version of the heuristic (i.e., “unmarried and
male”). A heuristic represents implicit knowledge in a way that
makes it the most available to conscious or explicit representation.
Contextual function is another source of implicit knowledge. As
an example of this, D&P point out that certain propositions (e.g.,
“the present king of France is bald,”) presuppose other proposi-
tions (e.g., that there is a present king of France). The presuppo-
sition is therefore implicit in the first proposition. Presuppositions
are given as the “prime case” of contextual function implicitness
(sect. 1, para. 6). A similar source of implicit knowledge, not ad-
dressed by D&P, is entailment. Two or more propositions, when
related according to a set of semantic rules, can entail certain
other propositions. These entailed propositions are implicitly con-
tained in the original propositions and the semantic rules. For ex-
ample, in Plato’s Meno (1986), through the process of questioning
a slave boy about geometry, Socrates succeeds in eliciting the
Pythagorean theorem. This is a sense of “implicit” that is not eas-
ily accounted for in D&P’s framework. The logical propositions
and the rules by which they are related to create the theorem are
explicitly known to the slave boy; it is the way in which they are
explicated that is new. This is a unique instance of implicitness. In
the case of “bachelor,” the implicit constituents are made explicit
through the efforts of the individual. In the case of entailments,
they are not, although they are recognized as being logical expli-
cations. Once explicated, entailments are immediately grasped by
the individual, although their previous existence was not explicitly
represented.
A final example of implicit knowledge is procedural knowledge.
Certain information (e.g., a rule, theory, or concept) is contained
implicitly in any procedure. For example, children who are able
to balance odd-shaped blocks on a beam have a naïve theory of
torque implicit in their balancing procedure (Karmiloff-Smith
1992). For this implicit information to become explicit, however,
simply telling an individual the implicit information is not enough.
Specific concepts may have to be learned so that children will re-
flect on their procedure and explicate their theory. In a series of
studies, Piaget (1976) investigated children’s explicit representa-
tions of their actions and found that there is a lag between their
ability to perform actions and their ability to describe how they
perform these actions. For example, children demonstrated great
skill in performing tasks that require centrifugal force (e.g., hitting
a target with a slingshot); however, the children’s representations
of how they succeeded on the task and the actual means by which
they achieved the result were discrepant. This is a case where im-
plicit knowledge (the procedure) and explicit representations con-
flict. How do children become aware of this implicit knowledge?
Piaget suggests that this is through the process of “reflexive ab-
straction,” which entails developing new conceptual structures
that allow the emergence of this reflexivity. Furthermore, the de-
velopment of these new conceptual structures may depend on ex-
trinsic factors. Homer and Olson (1999), for example, have found
evidence that literacy is responsible for children becoming aware
of certain linguistic properties of their speech.
In the examples above, we have presented three different forms
of implicit knowledge. One of the essential ways in which these
forms differ is in how the implicit knowledge can be made explicit.
For structurally implicit knowledge, an individual need only en-
gage in conscious reflection to explicate the implicit knowledge.
For functionally implicit knowledge, an individual must be told
the implicit knowledge (e.g., presupposition or entailment); how-
ever, once told, the implicit knowledge is immediately grasped
(i.e., explicitly known) by the individual. For procedurally implicit
knowledge, individuals must learn new concepts that can be used
to reflect on their procedure. The key point is that these different
forms of implicit knowledge become explicit in very different
ways. This suggests that they are represented by the individual in
qualitatively different ways. We suggest that any framework at-
tempting to capture the nature of knowledge representations
must account for these differences.
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